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In analysing the impact of education on wage differentials and wage growth, we use next to 
personal characteristics (e.g. education and experience) also job characteristics (e.g. skills 
required) to explain wages. We estimate wage equations on individual data for the USA, 1986 – 
1996. When discussing observed and previously unobserved heterogeneity it turns out that 
personal characteristics like education and experience explain about half of the variation in 
wages. At least 20 per cent is explained by variation in job characteristics. When comparing the 
results with similar research for the Netherlands, the returns to experience are the same in both 
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1.  Introduction 
 
There is a growing amount of literature that argues that wages are determined by both 
personal characteristics and job characteristics. A theoretical motivation for this notion is 
provided by the assignment or allocation literature stresses the interaction between 
demand and supply when explaining earnings differentials – cf. Hartog (1992) and 
Sattinger (1993). However, also imperfect-information search theoretical arguments and 
even human capital theory can provide a motivation to include job-related variables in the 
widely used Mincer (1974) earnings function (Hartog, 2000a). 
Along these lines, Muysken and Ruholl (2001) show that for the Netherlands 
1986 – 1998 indeed wage differentials should be explained by both personal and job 
characteristics. Roughly speaking half of the variation in wages can be explained by 
changes in personal characteristics, while the other half is explained by changes in job 
characteristics. In this study we will reproduce their analysis for the USA 1986 – 1996, 
using CPS data and compare the results with those found for the Netherlands. 
 
To illustrate the relevance of different developments in these characteristics we look at 
education as a person-related variable and skills required as a job-related variable – these 
variables turn out to be important determinants of wage differentials as we show below. 
Figure 1 shows the increase in educational attainment in the USA for the period 1986 – 
1996 from our data. During that decade the share of the working persons with grade 10 or 
less fell from 11,6 to 7,7 per cent. However, the share with college and full academic 
education (MA or PhD) increased from 43,8 to 55,1 per cent over that period. A similar 
development can be observed for the Netherlands. 
Figure 2 shows that the share of jobs requiring high skills increased from 30,5 to 
35,7 per cent over the observation period – this is much less than the increase 
corresponding share in educational attainment. Although popular belief might suggest 
that the USA has an abundance of low skilled jobs when compared to Europe, the share 
around 30 percent in the USA is hardly higher than the share around 28% in the 
Netherlands. As one might expect, in both countries these shares are slightly decreasing.  
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Figure 1  Share of the workforce in the USA with respect to education, 1986 – 1996 
 












































Comparison of Figures 1 and 2 suggests that the average level of education did increase 
stronger over time than the average level of skills required. This is consistent with the 
findings of Auerbach and Skott (2000) and Wolff (2000).
1 Moreover, this phenomenon 
has been observed in many countries, cf. the survey by Groot and Maassen van den Brink 
(2000).
2 
Table 1 demonstrates that upskilling in the USA took place in all job categories. 
Acemoglu (2000) explains this finding by skill-biased technological change, which 
accelerated since the early 1970s. Thus the average education of workers on jobs with a 
certain level of skills required has increased over time. This can be observed for each 
level, but the increase is higher the lower the required skill is. The latter phenomenon 
indicates that next to general upskilling, also bumping down has occurred.  
 
Table 1  Average educational level of the workforce in the USA for each level of 
required skills, 1986 – 1996 
Skills 
Year  unskilled  half-





skilled III  all 
1986 3,84 4,04 4,25 4,57 5,03 5,42 6,24 4,55 
1988 3,85 4,06 4,27 4,58 5,04 5,42 6,25 4,58 
1990 3,86 4,07 4,30 4,62 5,12 5,47 6,22 4,62 
1992 3,97 4,18 4,40 4,69 5,08 5,50 6,21 4,69 
1994 4,01 4,23 4,45 4,76 5,14 5,53 6,26 4,77 
1996 4,03 4,23 4,44 4,76 5,16 5,51 6,27 4,78 
 
The development of wages is well documented in Acemoglu (2000, section 2) who 
summarises several empirical trends for the US, which are relevant for our analysis. The 
returns to college education fell sharply during the 1970s – cf. Freeman’s (1976) 
                                                 
1 Although there are several studies discussing over- and undereducation in the US, most of them use data 
prior to 1990. Cf. the overview in Auerbach and Skott (2000). 
2 Auerbach and Skott (2000, n.7) point out rightly that the conclusion of Groot and Maassen van den Brink 
that the incidence of overeducation has declined, is inconsistent with their own regression results.  
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overeducated American – but during the 1980s returns rose sharply again. On the other 
hand overall wage inequality started to increase from the early 1970s onwards, after a 
period of relative stability. These developments are well documented and induced a 
strong debate on the causes of inequality, starting with Bound and Johnson (1992) and 
Katz and Murphy (1992). Acemoglu points at two additional developments, which got 
less attention in that debate. First, the decline in real terms of the wages of low-skill 
workers to levels below those in the early 1960s. Second, residual inequality increased 
sharply from the 1970s onwards. Residual or within-group inequality is inequality among 
observationally equivalent workers. Hence, from the early 1970s both overall and 
residual inequality increased steadily. 
 
The result that both overall and residual inequality increased, while during the 1970s 
returns to schooling fell, is quite puzzling. Acemoglu (2000, section 7) shows that from a 
simple skill model of wage inequality, this phenomenon can only be explained by 
changes in the distribution of unobserved skills – i.e. composition effects. However, 
reproducing the studies by Blackburn, Bloom and Freeman (1992) and Juhn, Murphy and 
Pierce (1993), Acemoglu (2000, section 9) argues that such effects do not explain the 
changes in the wage structure. That is, changes in the distribution of unobserved skills did 
not play an important role in this respect – changes in the composition of the explanatory 
variables in the Mincerian wage equation of course do matter.
3 
Acemoglu therefore concludes that one should use multi-dimensional skill models 
instead of single-index skill models to explain wage developments. He illustrates this for 
a model in which he distinguishes between two types of education and two types of skills. 
Actually Acemoglu’s “two-index skill” model is very close to our approach, once one 
assumes that unskilled means working in an unskilled job and skilled means working in a 
skilled job. Then Acemoglu’s explanation that skill-biased technical progress will benefit 
skilled workers in both educational groups, means in our explanation that skill biased 
technical progress benefits workers working in skilled jobs. The main difference between 
both interpretations is that in Acemoglu’s approach skills are unobserved, whereas in our 
                                                 
3 To derive this result Acemoglu assumes that for a specific age cohort the unobserved characteristics do 
not change over time. However, Table 1 shows that job characteristics do.  
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approach skills are observed by job characteristics. This also enables to test Acemoglu’s 
conclusion that the increase in residual inequality implies that the price of unobserved 
skills has increased (we reject this). 
 
The above findings suggest that in explaining the development of wages, we should also 
take into account the job characteristics of the workforce, next to personal characteristics. 
Section 2 shows that this notion is already well established in the litterature and presents 
a wage equation which takes this feature into account. Section 3 describes the data for 
which this equation will be estimated. The new element in our results compared to earlier 
studies is that we track the development of wages over a longer period, 1986 – 1996, and 
show that returns to education, experience and required skills are rather stable over time – 
cf. section 4.  
An interesting aspect of our approach is that we are able analyse the impact of 
including job characteristics in the wage equation on unobserved heterogeneity. Section 5 
takes a first step in that direction and shows how personal characteristics and job 
characteristics each influence the mean wage and the variation in the wage in a different 
way. It turns out that personal characteristics like education and experience explain about 
half of the variation in wages. At least 20 per cent is explained by variation in job 
characteristics.  
Finally, since Muysken and Ruholl (2001) have made a similar analysis for the 
Netherlands, we can compare the results for both countries. Section 6 shows that the 
returns to experience are the same in both countries, while the premiums on education 
and in particular required skills are much higher in the US. Moreover, a “good” match 
has a higher reward in the US, which suggests that its labour market is more efficient in 
that respect, when compared to the Netherlands. Section 7 concludes our analysis.  
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2.  The wage equation used 
 
Our approach suggests that in explaining the development of wages, we should take job 
characteristics into account, next to personal characteristics of the workforce. A 
specification of the wage equation which neatly allows for both types of characteristics, 
since it explicitly allows for both overeducation (O) and undereducation (U) next to 
required education (R), is what Hartog (2000a) calls the ORU-specification: 
 
wi = α  ri + β .max{0,(ai - ri)} - γ .max{0,(ri - ai)} + δ  zi + ε i    (1) 
 
where wi is the log of wage of individual i, ai her actual years of schooling and ri the 
years of schooling required for the job on which she is working – zi represents the other 
relevant characteristics. In this equation α  represents the premium to required education, 
β   the premium for overeducation and γ   the premium for undereducation.  
Hartog (2000a and b) surveys various studies in which this relationship has been 
estimated. He consistently finds with respect to the premiums α  > β  > γ  > 0. That is, 
when a person is working on a job where the required education equals her actual 
education, she earns more than when she is undereducated for that job. And when she is 
overeducated for that job, she would earn more when she would find a job that required 
her actual level of education. A consequence of Hartog’s finding also is that the ORU- 
specification performs better than the Mincerian wage equation (α  = β  = γ ) or the 
Thurow (1975) model of job competition (β  = γ  = 0). 
Groot and Maassen van den Brink (2000) find in their survey that α  > γ  > β  > 0 
prevails. The only difference with respect to Hartog’s conclusion is the ranking of the 
premiums for over- and undereducation. We use the ambiguity with respect to this 
ranking to motivate the restriction β  = γ . In that case we can separate the required skills 
and actual schooling in the wage equation, which leads to the following specification:  
 
wi = θ  ri + β  ai+ δ  zi + ε i        ( 2 )  
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Compared to equation (1) this implies that we assume β  = γ , and θ  = α  - β  should be 
positive. The advantage of equation (2) is that the specification does not require a direct 
comparison of actual and required education in terms of years of schooling. Our data do 
not allow such a comparison: Both actual and required skills are not defined in years of 
schooling, but in discrete educational and skills levels, respectively. We therefore prefer 
to impose the restriction that the premiums on under- and overeducation are equal. 
Moreover, the discrete nature of our measures implies that we estimate the equation in the 
following form:  
 
wi = Σ j=1..E  θ j rij + Σ j=1..S  β j aij+ δ  zi + ε i      ( 3 )  
 
where E is the number of educational levels we distinguish and S is the number of skill 
levels. The parameters θ j and  β j are the premiums for educational level and skill level j, 
respectively, and both should be increasing in j, since we expect a higher level to earn a 
higher premium. 
We will estimate equation (3) using data for the USA 1986 –1996. The difference 
with the studies reviewed in Hartog (2000a,b) and Groot and Maassen van den Brink 
(2000) is that our study systematically covers a longer period. Moreover we differentiate 
between different levels of education and different skill levels, although we then have to 
impose equal returns to under- and overeducation. Section 4 presents the estimation 
results. 
By explicitly observing job characteristics, our analysis also allows us to observe 
part of the otherwise “unobserved skills”. Thus we can further analyse the question of 
unobserved heterogeneity. This is measured by Acemoglu (2000) from the properties of 
the estimated values of ε  in equation (3), when this equation is estimated ignoring job 
charecteristics, i.e. under the restriction θ  = 0. We can compare these with the properties 
of the residual when equation (3) is estimated without this restriction. However, section 5 
takes a different approach to determine the impact of job characteristics on wage 
differentials, since Acemoglu’s approach leaves several questions open which we cannot 
solve in the present analysis. We  explain this in section 5. 
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3.  The data used 
 
We have used survey data obtained by the CPS for the years 1986 – 1996 (even years 
only). These data are a representative sample of the workforce. We eliminated those cases 
from the survey data for which either some observations were missing (in most cases) or 
some reported data seemed totally unreliable (in some cases only). However, the 
remaining size of the survey data remained too large to handle comfortably. Therefore we 
used only about half of the survey, drawn in a random way – this amounts to 
approximately 30,000 cases for each year. We used these data to estimate wage equations 
with explanatory variables which can be attributed either to the personal characteristics of 
the worker, or the job (s)he performs. 
Personal characteristics of the worker are first of course race, gender and age. 
However, since age correlates strongly with total experience, we only allow for an age 
dummy, which indicates whether the worker is younger than 20 years of age, or not. The 
motivation is that the youth minimum wage is highly increasing in age below 20 years in 
the early years of the sample. The second personal characteristic then is working 
experience. Moreover, in order to allow for decreasing returns to learning-on-the-job, 
total experience squared is added. The third personal characteristic is education received. 
Here we distinguish between educational level on the one hand and the type of 
educational instruction on the other. Finally we have included number of hours worked as 
a personal characteristic, although this is already on the borderline with job 
characteristics.  
The characteristics of the job occupied by the worker are first the size of the firm 
in which this job is located, large or small, whether the firm is under union coverage or 
not, and the kind of sector in which the firm is operating. Second the level of skills 
required on the job can be derived from the data.
4 
Information on these characteristics is summarised for each year in the Annex, 
together with the natural log of the hourly net wage, which is the dependent variable.  
                                                 
4 The data are transformed with the so-called ARBI scale, which starts from the detailed occupational 
classification and divides occupations into 7 skill levels, from low to high (Skill lev in our notation). The 
classification uses the complexity of occupations as a criterion and takes into account, amongst others, the  
 10
 
The data show a surprisingly equal and stable distribution between men and women in 
the workforce (cf. the gender dummy).
5 Moreover, the share of persons working full-time 
increases somewhat, which corresponds to a slight increase in the number of hours 
worked (Mhours). Also the share of workers of young age, below 20 years, has 
decreased, while the average experience of the workers increased somewhat over time. 
The share of lower educational levels decreases modestly over time, i.e. till grade 12, 
which is compensated by an increase of the share above that level. Thus the average 
educational level of the workforce increases over time, cf. also Figure 1 above. The share 
of persons occupying jobs with higher skill levels (5-7) increases too, whereas that with 
the lower skill levels (1-4) decreases, cf. also Figure 2 above. The shares or means of the 
other variables show no clear development over time. 
 
4.  The estimation results 
 
We used the data presented above to estimate the wage equation in the ORU-specification 
– cf equation (3) above. Since the ordinary least squares estimation results suffer from 
heteroskedasticity,
6 we re-estimated the equations with the HCCM (Heteroskedasticity 
Consistent Covariance Matrix) method offered by EViews (White, 1980). This method 
automatically computes the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, hence the t-
statistics are also meaningful.  
Table 2 shows that the estimated parameter values for most variables are 
remarkably constant over time – i.e. the parameter values lie within a relatively narrow 
range. Since this definitely is the case for those variables which have a large impact, 
compare Figures 3–5 below, we feel quite confident that our estimation results do not 
suffer strongly from a specification bias.
7 
                                                                                                                                                   
job content, the required knowledge and mental ability. More details are provided in Hartog (1992), 
pp.154-155 and Annex 5.2. 
5 In most European countries the share of men is larger, although it is decreasing over time. For instance, in 
the Netherlands the share of men decreased from 64 percent in 1986 to 56 percent in 1998. 
6 This was obvious from visual inspection of the estimated residuals and confirmed by White’s general test. 
7 In the spirit of the assignment approach we should estimate the job match simultaneously with our wage 
equation. However, Hartog (1992, Ch. 7) also finds that the specification bias does not have a significant 
impact. Moreover, in most instances the ORU-specification is estimated without any further discussion.  
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The estimation results indicate that almost all variables attributed to personal 
characteristics are highly significant for all years. As might be expected, being female, 
young or black all have a negative impact on hourly wages, as does working more hours. 
Both current and previous experiences have a positive impact, although with decreasing 
returns. The returns to education are positive too. 
Most of the variables attributed to job characteristics are significant too for all 
years. Both belonging to a unionised firm and working in a larger firm pay a higher 
wage.
8 And when the job requires a higher level of skills, this generally also yields a 
higher wage. 
We did not test for interaction effects between personal and job characteristics – 
in particular between educational and functional levels. According to the assignment 
approach such interaction would indicate comparative advantage for certain job-




Since both the direction of educational instruction and the sector in which the person is 
working are very broad aggregates and the pattern in the estimation results is not very 
clear, we will not elaborate the results for these two variables. All other results are 
discussed below. 
 
Age, race, gender and hours worked 
 
From the estimation results it can easily be inferred that being female implies that one 
would earn about 16 per cent less of the mean wage, when compared to otherwise similar 
males, although this percentage fluctuates over the years. A black person earns about 9 
per cent less. It can also be inferred that when working part-time, decreasing returns to 
                                                 
8 Actually the impact of firm size turned out to be insignificant, once we took union coverage into account. 
The reason is that union coverage is in particular strong in large firms. 
9 This is a question for further research, however. Some results for the Netherlands show interaction effects 
between education and experience.  
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hours worked prevail.
10 However, working full time instead of part-time (150 in stead of 
75 hours per month) yields a premium of approximately 12 per cent on the mean hourly 
wage, because working full time as such yields a premium too. Finally, the impact of the 
low level of the youth minimum wage shows up in the premium of being 20 years or 
older, which varies in the range of 3.5 to 7 per cent till 1994, from 1994 onwards this 
premium disappears. 
 
Experience and education 
 
We look at the returns to experience and education in more detail since they are crucial 
elements of a skill variable. Figure 3 shows the estimated premium to total experience 
after 17 years for each year in our sample. One sees that this estimated premium is quite 
stable over the sample period. Moreover, due to the property of diminishing returns, the 
maximum premium to experience is obtained after around 30 years. 
 
Figure 3  Premium to 17 years of experience, 1986 – 1996 
 
Figure 4 depicts the estimated premium on the various forms of education. As one might 
expect, this premium increases with the level of education. Moreover, the estimated 
premium for each level of education is quite stable over the sample period, although there 
is a dip in 1988. 
                                                 
10 This can be explained since we analyse the impact on net wages, i.e. after deduction of taxes and social 
security premiums. Because these premiums are relatively lower for low incomes, the net hourly wages 









1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 
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Figure 4  Premium to education, 1986 – 1996 
 
Job skills required 
 
An interesting variable for our analysis is the level of skills required for the job. Figure 5 
presents the impact of various levels of required skills, compared to no skills required. 
One sees that the impact generally increases with higher requirements, although levels 4 
and 5 are comparable, and levels 1 and 2 too.
11 
 
Figure 5  Premium on required skills, 1986 – 1998 
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1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
Skill lev2 Skill lev3 Skill lev45
Skill lev6 Skill lev7 
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Finally, an interesting observation follows from comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4. The 
impact of a higher skill level is lower on average than the impact of a higher level of 
education. We will use this observation later on to explain the relationship between 
overeducation and wage development. 
 
5.  Wage  differences due to personal and job characteristics 
 
Acemoglu (2000) found a strong increase in unobserved heterogeneity since the early 
1970s. He attributes this to an increased return to unobserved skills, assuming no change 
in the composition of unobserved skills. We have included job levels as an additional 
characteristic in the wage equation, which enables us to analyse the impact of this thusfar 
unobserved component on wage heterogeneity. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that the 
premium on these skills has remained constant over time, whereas Figure 2, and even 
more Table 1, show that their composition changed. We therefore do not agree with 
Acemoglu’s conclusion that the composition of unobserved skills has not changed, 
whereas their price has increased: It is the other way around, at least for the job 
characteristics. 
We do not reproduce Acemoglu’s analysis for our data, because at this stage of 
our analysis too many questions remain. We found strong heteroskedasticity in our 
estimated wage equations. This implies directly that increased overall inequality and 
unobserved heterogeneity will be observed simultaneously. However, the measures used 
by Acemoglu are inequality measures on the residuals. Hence the inequality in the 
residuals measured in this way is not related to the overall inequality, although this 
relationship is a prominent feature of Acemoglu’s analysis. To develop such a 
relationship falls outside the scope of the present analysis. We therefore leave a full 
analysis of unobserved heterogeneity for further research and proceed in a different way 
here. 
Figure 6 presents various manipulations with the wage equation of 1996 – the 
results are very similar for the other years. First we compare the fit of the equation to the 
observed data for various educational levels. One sees that the wage is slightly under 
estimated for all levels.   
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Figure 6  The mean hourly wage rate for 1996 
The estimated hourly wage I indicates the correction for job characteristics. That is, the 
firm is non-unionised, there are no skills required for the job and the firm sector is the 
manufacturing sector. It is interesting to observe that this hardly affects the mean wage of 
workers with educational levels 1-3, and only substantially affects the mean wage of 
workers with educational levels 6-7, which constitute less than 20 per cent of our sample. 
However, as Figure 7 shows, the distribution of the wages is definitely affected by the 
correction.
12 Whereas the estimated distribution is skewed to the right, although mean 
and mode more or less coincide, the corrected distribution is skewed to the left and the 
mode exceeds the mean. Thus wage differences become smaller when corrected for job 
characteristics. The latter is in particular due to the differences in skill levels occupied by 
workers. 
Moreover, since in particular the higher educated persons will occupy higher skill 
levels, it is not surprising to see that the mean income for the educational levels 6 and 7 
clearly is lower due to the correction for job characteristics. These characteristics account 
for 15-20 per cent of the mean hourly wage. 
EDLEVEL













As a final point it is interesting to observe that whereas, after the correction, the 
mean hourly wage differs from 6 at educational level 1-3 to 13 at educational level 7 – cf. 
Figure 6 – the dispersion of the wage for educational level 3 ranges from below 3 to 
above 9 – cf. Figure 7. This indicates that wage dispersion within educational groups is 
considerable, even after correction for job characteristics.  
Next the estimated hourly wage II shows the correction for the personal 
characteristic of experience. That is, in the estimated wages both current and previous 
experience, and total experience squared are set equal to zero. From Figure 6 one sees 
that this leads to a more or less equal reduction in the hourly wage for all educational 
levels. This is not surprising as long as experience is more or less equally distributed over 
all educational levels. Experience accounts for roughly an additional 20-30 per cent of the 
hourly wage. However, when comparing corrections I and II, one sees from the figure 
that education can partly compensate for a lack of experience. 
Figure 7 shows the quite interesting result that correction for experience leads to 
an enormous reduction in wage dispersion. While the initial dispersion was in the range 
3.5 – 13.5, although quite skewed, the correction for job characteristics reduced the range 
to 3.5 to 9.0 with a less skewed distribution. Finally correction for experience reduces the 
range to 3.5 to 6.0 with a hardly skewed distribution. Thus most of the dispersion per 
educational level observed after correction I (for job characteristics) is due to experience. 
The remaining factors – gender, hours worked, youth and direction of education – only 
contribute very little to wage dispersion per educational level.  
 
From these results we conclude that one third to one half of the total mean wage is 
independent of additional educational attainment, experience and job characteristics. For 
the lower educational levels experience fills most of the gap, for higher educational levels 
both education and skills requirements for jobs also start to pay off. However, the latter 
applies only to about 20 per cent of the work force.  
With respect to the variation in wages, job characteristics play an important role. 
Together with experience they explain an important part of the wage differences amongst 
workers per educational category. The remaining part of the wage differences is 
                                                                                                                                                   
12 The figure shows the results for educational level 3, but the results for the levels 2 and 4 are similar.  
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explained by educational level. Figure 6 shows that even after correction for job 
characteristics and experience, education causes a wage differential of almost 50 per 
cent.
13 This is also reflected in the high premium to education of Figure 4. 
 
6.  Comparison with results for the Netherlands 
 
It is interesting to compare the results presented above with those found in Muysken and 
Ruholl (2001) for the Netherlands. The composition of the labour force with respect to 
skills and required education is quite similar.
14 As a consequence the process of 
upgrading observed for the Netherlands is quite similar to that in Table 1 for the US. 
However, Table 3 shows that the wage differentials are much larger in the US. The 
observed wage differentials between highest and lowest education is a factor 2.85 – 
compare Figure 4 above. The corresponding factor for the Netherlands is 1.79. 
 
Table 3  Wage differentials highest and lowest education for the Netherlands and 
the USA, 1994 




USA 2.85 2.25 2.11 
NL 1.79  1.62  1.35 
 
Table 4  The impact of personal characteristics, the Netherlands and the USA, 1994-96 
  Gender  Age 









USA -0.165    -0.096  -0.00076 0.175  0.030  -0.0005
NL -0.146  -0.435    -0.00125   0.033  -0.0005
                                                 
13 These findings are also consistent with Sels cs. (2000) who find for Belgian white-collar workers in 1998 
that wage differences are explained for about 56 per cent by personal characteristics and the remaining part 
by job and organisation characteristics. 
14 When we compare Figures 1 and 2 above with the corresponding Figures 1 and 2 in Muysken and Ruholl 
(2001), we identify the US educational categories 0-10 yrs with “lower” education, 11-12 yrs and college 
with “extended and medium” education (subdivisions are quite different for both countries), Ba with 
“higher” education and MA/PhD with “university” education. Similarly, we identify the required skills un- 
and half-skilled with “lower”, skilled I and II with “extended” high skilled I with “medium” and high 
skilled II and III with “higher and university”.  
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Table 4 summarises the estimated impact of some personal characteristics for the 
Netherlands and the US, averaged over 1994 and 1996. Remarkable features are that the 
impact of gender on wages is quite similar for both countries. The impact of the age 
dummy and racial dummy is different, whereas part-time working also has a different 
impact on hourly wages – all this reflects institutional differences. However, we saw 
above that experience has a very strong impact on wage differentials. In that light it is 
remarkable that the return to experience is very similar in both countries. 
On the other hand, pronounced differences occur with respect to the impact of the 
other two variables that affect wage differentials: education and required skills. Figure 8 
shows that the premium on education is much higher in the US than it is in the 
Netherlands.
15 Since the distribution of education in the US is similar to that in the 
Netherlands, this implies that the difference in premium is an important source of 
difference in inequality. The same conclusion holds for differences in the premium on 
required skills: As Figure 9 shows, again premiums are higher in the US. 
The conclusion therefore is that the wage differentials between the USA and the 
Netherlands are mainly caused by differences in the premium for education and for 
required skills. Table 3 confirms this notion, since correction for job characteristics leads 
to a stronger reduction of the wage differential in the US than in the Netherlands, but the 
final wage differential, which is mainly due to education, remains as large as the original 
differential. 
These observations suggest that the premium on a good match between education 
and skill requirements is much higher in the US than in the Netherlands. In that respect 
the US labour market then is more efficient. 
                                                 
15 For the sake of comparison we took the Dutch level 4 to be equivalent to the American levels 4 and 5.  
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Figure 8  The impact of education on wages in the Netherlands and the USA, 1994-96 
 
Figure 9  The impact of required skills on wages in the Netherlands and the USA, 
1994-96 
 
Finally, an interesting observation follows from comparing Figures 8 and 9. Both 
in the Netherlands and in the US, the impact of a higher required skill level is lower on 
average than the impact of a higher level of education. Muysken and Ruholl (2001) use 
this notion to explain the divergence between educational attainment and wage-
productivity growth in the Netherlands. Essentially they argue that part of the increase in 
educational attainment is absorbed by increased skill requirements, which have a lower 
wage premium. A similar analysis might be relevant to the discussion of the productivity 
slow-down in the US. However, that is outside the scope of the present paper. 
 



























7. Concluding  remarks 
 
In this contribution we estimate wage equations on yearly individual data for the USA, 
1986 – 1996. In the tradition of Hartog’s (2000a) ORU-specification, we use job 
characteristics (e.g. skills required) next to personal characteristics (e.g. schooling and 
experience) also to explain wages. A new element in our study is that we track the 
development of wages over a longer period, 1986 – 1996. We find that returns to 
education, experience and required skills are rather stable over time – cf. section 4. 
An interesting aspect of our approach is that we are able analyse the impact of 
including job characteristics in the wage equation on unobserved heterogeneity. When 
analysing the impact of both observed and previously unobserved hetrogeneity, we find 
that personal characteristics like education and experience explain about half of the 
variation in wages. At least 20 per cent is explained by variation in job characteristics. 
Finally, since Muysken and Ruholl (2001) have made a similar analysis for the 
Netherlands, we compare the results for both countries. It turns out that the returns to 
experience are the same in both countries, while the premiums on education and in 
particular required skills are much higher in the US. Moreover, a “good” match has a 
higher reward in the US, which suggests that its labour market is more efficient in that 
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Annex The data used 
 
a)  Dependent Variable  
 
LN HW: Natural logarithm of hourly wage, where 
Hourly wage = (number of yearly periods net income is paid * net income per 
period)/(12 * hours worked per month)  
b)  Personal characteristics  
 
Gender:   Gender Dummy: female 1, male 0 
Agedum:   Age dummy: 1 for persons below 20, 0 otherwise 
Black:     Dummy Variable: 1 if black, 0 if non-black 
Texp:    Total  experience  in  years 
Texpsq:   Total experience squared 
Mhours:   Hours worked per month 
Fulltime:  Fulltime work dummy: 1 for >= 40 hrs worked per week, 0 
otherwise 
Edlevl3:  Dummy for educational attainment (note that the years of 
schooling measure refers to 1986-1990, while the credentials 
oriented measure applies to 1992-1996): 1 for 5-10 years of 
schooling or grades 5 through 10, 0 otherwise 
Edlevl4:  Dummy for educational attainment: 1 for 11-12 years of schooling 
or 11
th grade to High school graduate, diploma or GED, 0 
otherwise 
Edlevl5:  Dummy for educational attainment: 1 for 13-15 years of schooling, 
or some college, but no degree, to associate degree in college – 
academic program, 0 otherwise 
Edlevl6:  Dummy for educational attainment: 1 for 16 years of schooling, or 
Bachelor’s degree, 0 otherwise  
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Edlevl7:  Dummy for educational attainment: 1 for 17-18 years of schooling, 
or Master’s degree to Doctorate Degree, 0 otherwise 
Control Group:  Edlevl2: years of schooling 1-4 or up to and including 4
th grade 
(including less than 1
st grade) 
c)  Firm characteristics  
 
Unioncov:  Dummy for coverage of job through union contract: 1 if yes, 0 if 
not 
Funlev2:    Function level dummy: 1 for half-skilled, 0 otherwise 
Funlev3:   Function level dummy: 1 for skilled I, 0 otherwise 
Funlev45:  Function level dummy: 1 for skilled II or specialized higher skilled 
I, 0 otherwise 
Funlev5:  Function level dummy: 1 for specialized higher skilled I, 0 
otherwise 
Funlev6:  Function level dummy: 1 for specialized higher skilled II, 0 
otherwise 
Funlev7:  Function level dummy: 1 for specialized higher skilled III, 0 
otherwise 
Control Group:  Function level 1: unskilled 
 
Fsect234:  Firm sector dummy: 1 for trade, transport, and communication; 
banking, business and personal services; construction and 
agriculture, 0 otherwise 
Fsect3:  Firm sector dummy: 1 for banking, business and personal services, 
0 otherwise 
Fsect4:  Firm sector dummy: 1 for non-profit services (incl. public sector), 
0 otherwise  
Fsect5:  Firm sector dummy: 1 for construction and agriculture, 0 otherwise 
Control Group:  Firm sector 1: manufacturing  
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Table A  Summary of data used 1986-1998 
Year
Variables  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996 
LNHW 1,98  2,034 2,17 2,23 2,29  2,34
Gender 0,50  0,51 0,51 0,51 0,51  0,51
Agedum 0,078  0,079 0,071 0,058 0,056  0,062
Texp 16,58  16,78 17,35 17,87 18,01  18,35
Texpsq 452,90  455,25 472,36 482,62 483,00  495,28
Black 0,086  0,091 0,091 0,085 0,087  0,099
Mhours 150,042  150,89 151,39 151,51 153,29  154,41
Fulltime 0,71  0,71 0,72 0,72 0,73  0,74
Edlevl3 0,11  0,10 0,10 0,081 0,071  0,073
Edlevl4 0,45  0,45 0,43 0,39 0,38  0,37
Edlevl5 0,22  0,22 0,22 0,28 0,29  0,29
Edlevl6 0,14  0,13 0,15 0,17 0,18  0,18
Edlevl7 0,083  0,088 0,092 0,074 0,076  0,076
Unioncov 0,038  0,035 0,038 0,032 0,024  0,021
Funlev2 0,21  0,22 0,21 0,21 0,21  0,20
Funlev3 0,18  0,18 0,17 0,18 0,18  0,17
Funlev4 0,20  0,20 0,20 0,19 0,19  0,19
Funlev5 0,13  0,13 0,13 0,15 0,15  0,14
Funlev6 0,14  0,14 0,15 0,15 0,15  0,17
Funlev7 0,039  0,041 0,043 0,041 0,049  0,048
Fsect2 0,28  0,29 0,29 0,29 0,28  0,29
Fsect3 0,18  0,19 0,19 0,18 0,19  0,18
Fsect4 0,26  0,27 0,28 0,29 0,29  0,29
Fsect5 0,080  0,080 0,074 0,068 0,064  0,068
OBS used  31960  30678 33110 32088 29034  25928
OBS total  73833  70050 74521 70000 69722  60602
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Table 2  The estimation results (dependent variable LN hourly wages) 
 
Year 
Variables  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994  1996 
Constant  1.32 1.49 1.42 1.48 1.54 1.53
Gender  -0.21 -0.20 -0.19 -0.16 -0.17 -0.16
Agedum -0.077  -0.053 -0.035 -0.035 0.00050*  -0.013*
Black  -0.068 -0.086 -0.095 -0.093 -0.088 -0.103
Texp  0.028 0.027 0.027 0.028 0.030 0.030
Texpsq  -0.00047 -0.00047 -0.00046 -0.00048 -0.00050 -0.00050
Mhours  -0.00088 -0.00082 -0.00039 -0.00076 -0.00085 -0.00067
Fulltime  0.21 0.21 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.18
Edlevl3 0.17  0.081 0.19 0.12 0.086  0.16
Edlevl4  0.33 0.21 0.33 0.26 0.25 0.31
Edlevl5  0.45 0.32 0.48 0.38 0.37 0.43
Edlevl6  0.62 0.51 0.66 0.60 0.60 0.66
Edlevl7  0.71 0.57 0.75 0.70 0.74 0.79
Unioncov 0.12  0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13  0.100
Funlev2 -0.038  -0.040 -0.0090* 0.040 0.054  0.042
Funlev3  0.11 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.15 0.14
Funlev45  0.25 0.28 0.29 0.35 0.32 0.31
Funlev5 0.048  0.033 0.015* 0.0085* 0.021**  0.0029*
Funlev6  0.39 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.42
Funlev7  0.53 0.54 0.60 0.65 0.59 0.58
Fsect234  -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.11 -0.10 -0.11
Fsect3 0.0099*  0.016** 0.019 0.013* 0.0027*  -0.0040*
Fsect4 -0.0089*  -0.018** -0.027 -0.010* -0.017**  -0.008*
Fsect5  -0.073 -0.074 -0.073 -0.050 -0.036 -0.038
Adjusted  R²  0.47 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.43
* insignificant   
**  significant at 5% 
all others: significant at 1%    
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Std. Dev = 1.98  
Mean = 6.97
N = 1913.00



















Std. Dev = 1.46  
Mean = 6.72
N = 1913.00























Std. Dev = .57  
Mean = 5.08
N = 1913.00